gajim-plural/src/common/stanza_session.py

# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
## src/common/stanza_session.py
##
## Copyright (C) 2007 Julien Pivotto <roidelapluie AT gmail.com>
## Copyright (C) 2007-2008 Yann Leboulanger <asterix AT lagaule.org>
##                         Brendan Taylor <whateley AT gmail.com>
##                         Jean-Marie Traissard <jim AT lapin.org>
## Copyright (C) 2008 Jonathan Schleifer <js-gajim AT webkeks.org>
##
## This file is part of Gajim.
##
## Gajim is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
## it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
## by the Free Software Foundation; version 3 only.
##
## Gajim is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
## but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
## MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
## GNU General Public License for more details.
##
## You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
## along with Gajim. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
##

from common import gajim
from common import xmpp
from common.exceptions import DecryptionError, NegotiationError
import xmpp.c14n

import itertools
import random
import string
import time
import base64
import os
from hashlib import sha256
from hmac import HMAC
from common import crypto

if gajim.HAVE_PYCRYPTO:
	from Crypto.Cipher import AES
	from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA

	from common import dh
	import secrets

XmlDsig = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'

class StanzaSession(object):
	'''
	'''
	def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_):
		'''
		'''
		self.conn = conn
		self.jid = jid
		self.type = type_
		self.resource = None

		if thread_id:
			self.received_thread_id = True
			self.thread_id = thread_id
		else:
			self.received_thread_id = False
			if type_ == 'normal':
				self.thread_id = None
			else:
				self.thread_id = self.generate_thread_id()

		self.loggable = True

		self.last_send = 0
		self.last_receive = 0
		self.status = None
		self.negotiated = {}

	def is_loggable(self):
		return self.loggable and gajim.config.should_log(self.conn.name, self.jid)

	def get_to(self):
		to = str(self.jid)
		if self.resource and not to.endswith(self.resource):
			to += '/' + self.resource
		return to

	def remove_events(self, types):
		'''
		Remove events associated with this session from the queue.
		returns True if any events were removed (unlike events.py remove_events)
		'''
		any_removed = False

		for j in (self.jid, self.jid.getStripped()):
			for event in gajim.events.get_events(self.conn.name, j, types=types):
				# the event wasn't in this session
				if (event.type_ == 'chat' and event.parameters[8] != self) or \
				(event.type_ == 'printed_chat' and event.parameters[0].session != \
				self):
					continue

				# events.remove_events returns True when there were no events
				# for some reason
				r = gajim.events.remove_events(self.conn.name, j, event)

				if not r:
					any_removed = True

		return any_removed

	def generate_thread_id(self):
		return ''.join([f(string.ascii_letters) for f in itertools.repeat(
			random.choice, 32)])

	def send(self, msg):
		if self.thread_id:
			msg.NT.thread = self.thread_id

		msg.setAttr('to', self.get_to())
		self.conn.send_stanza(msg)

		if isinstance(msg, xmpp.Message):
			self.last_send = time.time()

	def reject_negotiation(self, body=None):
		msg = xmpp.Message()
		feature = msg.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='0'))

		feature.addChild(node=x)

		if body:
			msg.setBody(body)

		self.send(msg)

		self.cancelled_negotiation()

	def cancelled_negotiation(self):
		'''
		A negotiation has been cancelled, so reset this session to its default
		state.
		'''
		if self.control:
			self.control.on_cancel_session_negotiation()

		self.status = None
		self.negotiated = {}

	def terminate(self, send_termination = True):
		# only send termination message if we've sent a message and think they
		# have XEP-0201 support
		if send_termination and self.last_send > 0 and \
		(self.received_thread_id or self.last_receive == 0):
			msg = xmpp.Message()
			feature = msg.NT.feature
			feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

			x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')
			x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
			x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='terminate', value='1'))

			feature.addChild(node=x)

			self.send(msg)

		self.status = None

	def acknowledge_termination(self):
		# we could send an acknowledgement message to the remote client here
		self.status = None


class ArchivingStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
	def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat'):
		StanzaSession.__init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat')
		self.archiving = False

	def archiving_logging_preference(self, initiator_options=None):
		return self.conn.logging_preference(self.jid, initiator_options)

	def negotiate_archiving(self):
		self.negotiated = {}

		request = xmpp.Message()
		feature = request.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='form')

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn',
			typ='hidden'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1', typ='boolean',
			required=True))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', typ='list-single',
			options=self.archiving_logging_preference(), required=True))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='disclosure', typ='list-single',
			options=['never'], required=True))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='security', typ='list-single',
			options=['none'], required=True))

		feature.addChild(node=x)

		self.status = 'requested-archiving'

		self.send(request)

	def respond_archiving(self, form):
		field = form.getField('logging')
		options = [x[1] for x in field.getOptions()]
		values = field.getValues()

		logging = self.archiving_logging_preference(options)
		self.negotiated['logging'] = logging

		response = xmpp.Message()
		feature = response.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true'))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', value=logging))

		self.status = 'responded-archiving'

		feature.addChild(node=x)

		if not logging:
			response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)

			feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature')

			n = xmpp.Node('field')
			n['var'] = 'logging'
			feature.addChild(node=n)

			response.T.error.addChild(node=feature)

		self.send(response)

	def we_accept_archiving(self, form):
		if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
			self.loggable = False
		log.debug('archiving session accepted: %s' % self.loggable)
		self.status = 'active'
		self.archiving = True
		if self.control:
			self.control.print_archiving_session_details()

	def archiving_accepted(self, form):
		negotiated = {}
		ask_user = {}
		not_acceptable = []

		if form['logging'] not in self.archiving_logging_preference():
			raise

		self.negotiated['logging'] = form['logging']

		accept = xmpp.Message()
		feature = accept.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')

		result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE',
			value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1'))

		feature.addChild(node=result)

		self.send(accept)
		if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
			self.loggable = False
		log.debug('archiving session accepted: %s' % self.loggable)
		self.status = 'active'
		self.archiving = True
		if self.control:
			self.control.print_archiving_session_details()


class EncryptedStanzaSession(StanzaSession):
	'''
	An encrypted stanza negotiation has several states. They arerepresented	as
	the following values in the 'status' attribute of the session object:

		1. None:
				default state
		2. 'requested-e2e':
				this client has initiated an esession negotiation and is waiting
				for a response
		3. 'responded-e2e':
				this client has responded to an esession negotiation request and
				is waiting for the initiator to identify itself and complete the
				negotiation
 		4. 'identified-alice':
				this client identified itself and is waiting for the responder to
				identify itself and complete the negotiation
		5. 'active':
				an encrypted session has been successfully negotiated. messages
				of any of the types listed in 'encryptable_stanzas' should be
				encrypted before they're sent.

	The transition between these states is handled in gajim.py's
	handle_session_negotiation method.
	'''
	def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat'):
		StanzaSession.__init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat')

		self.xes = {}
		self.es = {}
		self.n = 128
		self.enable_encryption = False

		# _s denotes 'self' (ie. this client)
		self._kc_s = None
		# _o denotes 'other' (ie. the client at the other end of the session)
		self._kc_o = None

		# has the remote contact's identity ever been verified?
		self.verified_identity = False

	def _get_contact(self):
		c = gajim.contacts.get_contact(self.conn.name, self.jid, self.resource)
		if not c:
			c = gajim.contacts.get_contact(self.conn.name, self.jid)
		return c

	def _is_buggy_gajim(self):
		c = self._get_contact()
		if c and c.supports(xmpp.NS_ROSTERX):
			return False
		return True

	def set_kc_s(self, value):
		'''
		keep the encrypter updated with my latest cipher key
		'''
		self._kc_s = value
		self.encrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_s, self.cipher.MODE_CTR,
			counter=self.encryptcounter)

	def get_kc_s(self):
		return self._kc_s

	def set_kc_o(self, value):
		'''
		keep the decrypter updated with the other party's latest cipher key
		'''
		self._kc_o = value
		self.decrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_o, self.cipher.MODE_CTR,
			counter=self.decryptcounter)

	def get_kc_o(self):
		return self._kc_o

	kc_s = property(get_kc_s, set_kc_s)
	kc_o = property(get_kc_o, set_kc_o)

	def encryptcounter(self):
		self.c_s = (self.c_s + 1) % (2 ** self.n)
		return crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_s)

	def decryptcounter(self):
		self.c_o = (self.c_o + 1) % (2 ** self.n)
		return crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o)

	def sign(self, string):
		if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
			hash_ = crypto.sha256(string)
			return crypto.encode_mpi(gajim.pubkey.sign(hash_, '')[0])

	def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
		encryptable = [x for x in stanza.getChildren() if x.getName() not in
			('error', 'amp', 'thread')]

		# FIXME can also encrypt contents of <error/> elements in stanzas @type =
		# 'error'
		# (except for <defined-condition
		# xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/> child elements)

		old_en_counter = self.c_s

		for element in encryptable:
			stanza.delChild(element)

		plaintext = ''.join(map(str, encryptable))

		m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext)
		m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed)

		c = stanza.NT.c
		c.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')
		c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final)

		# FIXME check for rekey request, handle <key/> elements

		m_content = ''.join(map(str, c.getChildren()))
		c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + \
			crypto.encode_mpi(old_en_counter)))

		msgtxt = '[This is part of an encrypted session. ' \
			'If you see this message, something went wrong.]'
		lang = os.getenv('LANG')
		if lang is not None and lang != 'en': # we're not english
			msgtxt = _('[This is part of an encrypted session. '
				'If you see this message, something went wrong.]') + ' (' + \
				msgtxt + ')'
		stanza.setBody(msgtxt)

		return stanza

	def is_xep_200_encrypted(self, msg):
		msg.getTag('c', namespace=xmpp.NS_STANZA_CRYPTO)

	def hmac(self, key, content):
		return HMAC(key, content, self.hash_alg).digest()

	def generate_initiator_keys(self, k):
		return (self.hmac(k, 'Initiator Cipher Key'),
			self.hmac(k, 'Initiator MAC Key'),
			self.hmac(k, 'Initiator SIGMA Key'))

	def generate_responder_keys(self, k):
		return (self.hmac(k, 'Responder Cipher Key'),
			self.hmac(k, 'Responder MAC Key'),
			self.hmac(k, 'Responder SIGMA Key'))

	def compress(self, plaintext):
		if self.compression is None:
			return plaintext

	def decompress(self, compressed):
		if self.compression is None:
			return compressed

	def encrypt(self, encryptable):
		padded = crypto.pad_to_multiple(encryptable, 16, ' ', False)

		return self.encrypter.encrypt(padded)

	def decrypt_stanza(self, stanza):
		''' delete the unencrypted explanation body, if it exists '''
		orig_body = stanza.getTag('body')
		if orig_body:
			stanza.delChild(orig_body)

		c = stanza.getTag(name='c',
			namespace='http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns')

		stanza.delChild(c)

		# contents of <c>, minus <mac>, minus whitespace
		macable = ''.join(str(x) for x in c.getChildren() if x.getName() != 'mac')

		received_mac = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('mac'))
		calculated_mac = self.hmac(self.km_o, macable + \
			crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o))

		if not calculated_mac == received_mac:
			raise DecryptionError('bad signature')

		m_final = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('data'))
		m_compressed = self.decrypt(m_final)
		plaintext = self.decompress(m_compressed)

		try:
			parsed = xmpp.Node(node='<node>' + plaintext + '</node>')
		except Exception:
			raise DecryptionError('decrypted <data/> not parseable as XML')

		for child in parsed.getChildren():
			stanza.addChild(node=child)

		return stanza

	def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
		return self.decrypter.decrypt(ciphertext)

	def logging_preference(self):
		if gajim.config.get_per('accounts', self.conn.name,
		'log_encrypted_sessions'):
			return ['may', 'mustnot']
		else:
			return ['mustnot', 'may']

	def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p):
		if (not 1 < e < (p - 1)):
			raise NegotiationError('invalid DH value')

		return crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(crypto.powmod(e, y, p)))

	def c7lize_mac_id(self, form):
		kids = form.getChildren()
		macable = [x for x in kids if x.getVar() not in ('mac', 'identity')]
		return ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el in \
			macable)

	def verify_identity(self, form, dh_i, sigmai, i_o):
		m_o = base64.b64decode(form['mac'])
		id_o = base64.b64decode(form['identity'])

		m_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_o)

		if m_o_calculated != m_o:
			raise NegotiationError('calculated m_%s differs from received m_%s' %
				(i_o, i_o))

		if i_o == 'a' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
			# we don't need to calculate this if there's a verified retained secret
			# (but we do anyways)
			self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_o, self.form_s)

		if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
			plaintext = self.decrypt(id_o)
			parsed = xmpp.Node(node='<node>' + plaintext + '</node>')

			if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey'] == 'hash':
				# fingerprint = parsed.getTagData('fingerprint')
				# FIXME find stored pubkey or terminate session
				raise NotImplementedError()
			else:
				if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
					keyvalue = parsed.getTag(name='RSAKeyValue', namespace=XmlDsig)

					n, e = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(
						keyvalue.getTagData(x))) for x in ('Modulus', 'Exponent'))
					eir_pubkey = RSA.construct((n,long(e)))

					pubkey_o = xmpp.c14n.c14n(keyvalue, self._is_buggy_gajim())
				else:
					# FIXME DSA, etc.
					raise NotImplementedError()

			enc_sig = parsed.getTag(name='SignatureValue',
				namespace=XmlDsig).getData()
			signature = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(enc_sig)), )
		else:
			mac_o = self.decrypt(id_o)
			pubkey_o = ''

		c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form)

		content = self.n_s + self.n_o + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_o

		if sigmai:
			self.form_o = c7l_form
			content += self.form_o
		else:
			form_o2 = c7l_form
			content += self.form_o + form_o2

		mac_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content)

		if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']:
			hash_ = crypto.sha256(mac_o_calculated)

			if not eir_pubkey.verify(hash_, signature):
				raise NegotiationError('public key signature verification failed!')

		elif mac_o_calculated != mac_o:
			raise NegotiationError('calculated mac_%s differs from received mac_%s'
				% (i_o, i_o))

	def make_identity(self, form, dh_i):
		if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
			if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'):
				pubkey = secrets.secrets().my_pubkey(self.conn.name)
				fields = (pubkey.n, pubkey.e)

				cb_fields = [base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(f)) for f in
					fields]

				pubkey_s = '<RSAKeyValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"'
				'><Modulus>%s</Modulus><Exponent>%s</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>' % \
					tuple(cb_fields)
		else:
			pubkey_s = ''

		form_s2 = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el in \
			form.getChildren())

		old_c_s = self.c_s
		content = self.n_o + self.n_s + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_s + \
			self.form_s + form_s2

		mac_s = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content)

		if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']:
			signature = self.sign(mac_s)

			sign_s = '<SignatureValue xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">'
			'%s</SignatureValue>' % base64.b64encode(signature)

			if self.negotiated['send_pubkey'] == 'hash':
				b64ed = base64.b64encode(self.hash(pubkey_s))
				pubkey_s = '<fingerprint>%s</fingerprint>' % b64ed

			id_s = self.encrypt(pubkey_s + sign_s)
		else:
			id_s = self.encrypt(mac_s)

		m_s = self.hmac(self.km_s, crypto.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_s)

		if self.status == 'requested-e2e' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5':
			# we're alice; check for a retained secret
			# if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS
			self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_s, self.form_o)

			if self.sigmai:
				# FIXME save retained secret?
				self.check_identity(tuple)

		return (xmpp.DataField(name='identity', value=base64.b64encode(id_s)),
			xmpp.DataField(name='mac', value=base64.b64encode(m_s)))

	def negotiate_e2e(self, sigmai):
		self.negotiated = {}

		request = xmpp.Message()
		feature = request.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='form')

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn',
			typ='hidden'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1', typ='boolean',
			required=True))

		# this field is incorrectly called 'otr' in XEPs 0116 and 0217
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', typ='list-single',
			options=self.logging_preference(), required=True))

		# unsupported options: 'disabled', 'enabled'
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='disclosure', typ='list-single',
			options=['never'], required=True))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='security', typ='list-single',
			options=['e2e'], required=True))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='crypt_algs', value='aes128-ctr',
			typ='hidden'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='hash_algs', value='sha256',
			typ='hidden'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='compress', value='none',
			typ='hidden'))

		# unsupported options: 'iq', 'presence'
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='stanzas', typ='list-multi',
			options=['message']))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='init_pubkey', options=['none', 'key',
			'hash'], typ='list-single'))

		# FIXME store key, use hash
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='resp_pubkey', options=['none',
			'key'], typ='list-single'))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='ver', value='1.0', typ='hidden'))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rekey_freq', value='4294967295',
			typ='hidden'))

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='sas_algs', value='sas28x5',
			typ='hidden'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='sign_algs',
			value='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha256', typ='hidden'))

		self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce()

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='my_nonce',
			value=base64.b64encode(self.n_s), typ='hidden'))

		modp_options = [ int(g) for g in gajim.config.get('esession_modp').split(
			',') ]

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', typ='list-single',
			options=[[None, y] for y in modp_options]))

		x.addChild(node=self.make_dhfield(modp_options, sigmai))
		self.sigmai = sigmai

		self.form_s = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \
			in x.getChildren())

		feature.addChild(node=x)

		self.status = 'requested-e2e'

		self.send(request)

	def verify_options_bob(self, form):
		''' 4.3 esession response (bob) '''
		negotiated = {'recv_pubkey': None, 'send_pubkey': None}
		not_acceptable = []
		ask_user = {}

		fixed = { 'disclosure': 'never', 'security': 'e2e',
			'crypt_algs': 'aes128-ctr', 'hash_algs': 'sha256', 'compress': 'none',
			'stanzas': 'message', 'init_pubkey': 'none', 'resp_pubkey': 'none',
			'ver': '1.0', 'sas_algs': 'sas28x5' }

		self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message']

		self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
		self.cipher = AES
		self.hash_alg = sha256
		self.compression = None

		for name in form.asDict():
			field = form.getField(name)
			options = [x[1] for x in field.getOptions()]
			values = field.getValues()

			if not field.getType() in ('list-single', 'list-multi'):
				options = values

			if name in fixed:
				if fixed[name] in options:
					negotiated[name] = fixed[name]
				else:
					not_acceptable.append(name)
			elif name == 'rekey_freq':
				preferred = int(options[0])
				negotiated['rekey_freq'] = preferred
				self.rekey_freq = preferred
			elif name == 'logging':
				my_prefs = self.logging_preference()

				if my_prefs[0] in options: # our first choice is offered, select it
					pref = my_prefs[0]
					negotiated['logging'] = pref
				else:	# see if other acceptable choices are offered
					for pref in my_prefs:
						if pref in options:
							ask_user['logging'] = pref
							break

					if not 'logging' in ask_user:
						not_acceptable.append(name)
			elif name == 'init_pubkey':
				for x in ('key'):
					if x in options:
						negotiated['recv_pubkey'] = x
						break
			elif name == 'resp_pubkey':
				for x in ('hash', 'key'):
					if x in options:
						negotiated['send_pubkey'] = x
						break
			elif name == 'sign_algs':
				if (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256') in options:
					negotiated['sign_algs'] = XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'
			else:
				# FIXME some things are handled elsewhere, some things are
				# not-implemented
				pass

		return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user)

	def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable):
		''' 4.3 esession response (bob) '''
		response = xmpp.Message()
		feature = response.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit')

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true'))

		for name in negotiated:
			# some fields are internal and should not be sent
			if not name in ('send_pubkey', 'recv_pubkey'):
				x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=negotiated[name]))

		self.negotiated = negotiated

		# the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash)
		group_order = 0
		self.modp = int(form.getField('modp').getOptions()[group_order][1])
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', value=self.modp))

		g = dh.generators[self.modp]
		p = dh.primes[self.modp]

		self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])

		dhhashes = form.getField('dhhashes').getValues()
		self.negotiated['He'] = base64.b64decode(dhhashes[group_order].encode(
			'utf8'))

		bytes = int(self.n / 8)

		self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce()

		# n-bit random number
		self.c_o = crypto.decode_mpi(crypto.random_bytes(bytes))
		self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))

		self.y = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)
		self.d = crypto.powmod(g, self.y, p)

		to_add = {'my_nonce': self.n_s,
			'dhkeys': crypto.encode_mpi(self.d),
			'counter': crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o),
			'nonce': self.n_o}

		for name in to_add:
			b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name])
			x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed))

		self.form_o = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \
			in form.getChildren())
		self.form_s = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \
			in x.getChildren())

		self.status = 'responded-e2e'

		feature.addChild(node=x)

		if not_acceptable:
			response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE)

			feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature')

			for f in not_acceptable:
				n = xmpp.Node('field')
				n['var'] = f
				feature.addChild(node=n)

			response.T.error.addChild(node=feature)

		self.send(response)

	def verify_options_alice(self, form):
		''' 'Alice Accepts' '''
		negotiated = {}
		ask_user = {}
		not_acceptable = []

		if not form['logging'] in self.logging_preference():
			not_acceptable.append(form['logging'])
		elif form['logging'] != self.logging_preference()[0]:
			ask_user['logging'] = form['logging']
		else:
			negotiated['logging'] = self.logging_preference()[0]

		for r,a in (('recv_pubkey', 'resp_pubkey'), ('send_pubkey',
		'init_pubkey')):
			negotiated[r] = None

			if a in form.asDict() and form[a] in ('key', 'hash'):
				negotiated[r] = form[a]

		if 'sign_algs' in form.asDict():
			if form['sign_algs'] in (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256', ):
				negotiated['sign_algs'] = form['sign_algs']
			else:
				not_acceptable.append(form['sign_algs'])

		return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user)

	def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated):
		''' 'Alice Accepts', continued '''
		self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message']
		self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5'
		self.cipher = AES
		self.hash_alg = sha256 
		self.compression = None

		self.negotiated = negotiated

		accept = xmpp.Message()
		feature = accept.NT.feature
		feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE)

		result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')

		self.c_s = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['counter']))
		self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1))
		self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce'])

		mod_p = int(form['modp'])
		p = dh.primes[mod_p]
		x = self.xes[mod_p]
		e = self.es[mod_p]

		self.d = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
		self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p)

		result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE',
			value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1'))
		result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce',
			value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o)))

		self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k)

		if self.sigmai:
			self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(self.k)
			self.verify_identity(form, self.d, True, 'b')
		else:
			srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
				self.jid.getStripped())
			rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs[0]) for rs in srses]

			if not rshashes:
				# we've never spoken before, but we'll pretend we have
				rshash_size = self.hash_alg().digest_size
				rshashes.append(crypto.random_bytes(rshash_size))

			rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes]
			result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rshashes', value=rshashes))
			result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='dhkeys',
				value=base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e))))

			self.form_o = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for \
				el in form.getChildren())

		# MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the
		# final shared secret

		for datafield in self.make_identity(result, e):
			result.addChild(node=datafield)

		feature.addChild(node=result)
		self.send(accept)

		if self.sigmai:
			self.status = 'active'
			self.enable_encryption = True
		else:
			self.status = 'identified-alice'

	def accept_e2e_bob(self, form):
		''' 4.5 esession accept (bob) '''
		response = xmpp.Message()

		init = response.NT.init
		init.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_ESESSION_INIT)

		x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result')

		for field in ('nonce', 'dhkeys', 'rshashes', 'identity', 'mac'):
			# FIXME: will do nothing in real world...
			assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" \
				% field

		# 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys
		e = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys']))
		p = dh.primes[self.modp]

		if crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) != self.negotiated['He']:
			raise NegotiationError('SHA256(e) != He')

		k = self.get_shared_secret(e, self.y, p)
		self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)

		# 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity
		self.verify_identity(form, e, False, 'a')

		# 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys
		srs = ''

		srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
			self.jid.getStripped())
		rshashes = [base64.b64decode(rshash) for rshash in form.getField(
			'rshashes').getValues()]

		for s in srses:
			secret = s[0]
			if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes:
				srs = secret
				break

		# other shared secret
		# (we're not using one)
		oss = ''

		k = crypto.sha256(k + srs + oss)

		self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k)
		self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)

		# 4.5.5
		if srs:
			srshash = self.hmac(srs, 'Shared Retained Secret')
		else:
			srshash = crypto.random_bytes(32)

		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn'))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode(
			self.n_o)))
		x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='srshash', value=base64.b64encode(
			srshash)))

		for datafield in self.make_identity(x, self.d):
			x.addChild(node=datafield)

		init.addChild(node=x)

		self.send(response)

		self.do_retained_secret(k, srs)

		if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
			self.loggable = False

		self.status = 'active'
		self.enable_encryption = True

		if self.control:
			self.control.print_esession_details()

	def final_steps_alice(self, form):
		srs = ''
		srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name,
			self.jid.getStripped())

		try:
			srshash = base64.b64decode(form['srshash'])
		except IndexError:
			return

		for s in srses:
			secret = s[0]
			if self.hmac(secret, 'Shared Retained Secret') == srshash:
				srs = secret
				break

		oss = ''
		k = crypto.sha256(self.k + srs + oss)
		del self.k

		self.do_retained_secret(k, srs)

		# ks_s doesn't need to be calculated here
		self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(k)
		self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(k)

		# 4.6.2 Verifying Bob's Identity
		self.verify_identity(form, self.d, False, 'b')
		# Note: If Alice discovers an error then she SHOULD ignore any encrypted
		# content she received in the stanza.

		if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot':
			self.loggable = False

		self.status = 'active'
		self.enable_encryption = True

		if self.control:
			self.control.print_esession_details()

	def do_retained_secret(self, k, old_srs):
		'''
		Calculate the new retained secret. determine if the user needs to check
		the remote party's identity. Set up callbacks for when the identity has
		been verified.
		'''
		new_srs = self.hmac(k, 'New Retained Secret')
		self.srs = new_srs

		account = self.conn.name
		bjid = self.jid.getStripped()

		self.verified_identity = False

		if old_srs:
			if secrets.secrets().srs_verified(account, bjid, old_srs):
				# already had a stored secret verified by the user.
				secrets.secrets().replace_srs(account, bjid, old_srs, new_srs, True)
				# continue without warning.
				self.verified_identity = True
			else:
				# had a secret, but it wasn't verified.
				secrets.secrets().replace_srs(account, bjid, old_srs, new_srs,
					False)
		else:
			# we don't even have an SRS
			secrets.secrets().save_new_srs(account, bjid, new_srs, False)

	def _verified_srs_cb(self):
		secrets.secrets().replace_srs(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped(),
			self.srs, self.srs, True)

	def _unverified_srs_cb(self):
		secrets.secrets().replace_srs(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped(),
			self.srs, self.srs, False)

	def make_dhfield(self, modp_options, sigmai):
		dhs = []

		for modp in modp_options:
			p = dh.primes[modp]
			g = dh.generators[modp]

			x = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1)

			# FIXME this may be a source of performance issues
			e = crypto.powmod(g, x, p)

			self.xes[modp] = x
			self.es[modp] = e

			if sigmai:
				dhs.append(base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e)))
				name = 'dhkeys'
			else:
				He = crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e))
				dhs.append(base64.b64encode(He))
				name = 'dhhashes'

		return xmpp.DataField(name=name, typ='hidden', value=dhs)

	def terminate_e2e(self):
		self.terminate()
		self.enable_encryption = False

	def acknowledge_termination(self):
		StanzaSession.acknowledge_termination(self)
		self.enable_encryption = False

	def fail_bad_negotiation(self, reason, fields=None):
		'''
		Sends an error and cancels everything.

		If fields is None, the remote party has given us a bad cryptographic
		value of some kind. Otherwise, list the fields we haven't implemented
		'''
		err = xmpp.Error(xmpp.Message(), xmpp.ERR_FEATURE_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)
		err.T.error.T.text.setData(reason)

		if fields:
			feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature')

			for field in fields:
				fn = xmpp.Node('field')
				fn['var'] = field
				feature.addChild(node=feature)

			err.addChild(node=feature)

		self.send(err)

		self.status = None
		self.enable_encryption = False

		# this prevents the MAC check on decryption from succeeding,
		# preventing falsified messages from going through.
		self.km_o = ''

	def cancelled_negotiation(self):
		StanzaSession.cancelled_negotiation(self)
		self.enable_encryption = False
		self.km_o = ''

# vim: se ts=3: