milis/talimatname/genel/gegl2/gegl-0.2.0-CVE-2012-4433.patch

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2017-04-07 03:41:04 +02:00
From ffa77a246652c7e706d690682fe659f50fbe5656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nils Philippsen <nils@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2013 12:03:51 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] patch: CVE-2012-4433
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 2a9071e2dc4cfe1aaa7a726805985281936f9874
Author: Nils Philippsen <nils@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Oct 16 16:57:37 2012 +0200
ppm-load: bring comment in line with reality
(cherry picked from commit 6975a9cfeaf0698b42ac81b1c2f00d13c8755453)
commit 8bb88ebf78e54837322d3be74688f98800e9f33a
Author: Nils Philippsen <nils@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Oct 16 16:56:40 2012 +0200
ppm-load: CVE-2012-4433: add plausibility checks for header fields
Refuse values that are non-decimal, negative or overflow the target
type.
(cherry picked from commit 4757cdf73d3675478d645a3ec8250ba02168a230)
commit 2b099886969bf055a8635d06a4d89f20fed1ee42
Author: Nils Philippsen <nils@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Oct 16 16:58:27 2012 +0200
ppm-load: CVE-2012-4433: don't overflow memory allocation
Carefully selected width/height values could cause the size of a later
allocation to overflow, resulting in a buffer much too small to store
the data which would then written beyond its end.
(cherry picked from commit 1e92e5235ded0415d555aa86066b8e4041ee5a53)
---
operations/external/ppm-load.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/operations/external/ppm-load.c b/operations/external/ppm-load.c
index efe6d56..e22521c 100644
--- a/operations/external/ppm-load.c
+++ b/operations/external/ppm-load.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ gegl_chant_file_path (path, _("File"), "", _("Path of file to load."))
#include "gegl-chant.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
typedef enum {
PIXMAP_ASCII = 51,
@@ -44,8 +45,8 @@ typedef enum {
typedef struct {
map_type type;
- gint width;
- gint height;
+ glong width;
+ glong height;
gsize numsamples; /* width * height * channels */
gsize bpc; /* bytes per channel */
guchar *data;
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ ppm_load_read_header(FILE *fp,
gchar header[MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW];
gint maxval;
- /* Check the PPM file Type P2 or P5 */
+ /* Check the PPM file Type P3 or P6 */
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
if (header[0] != ASCII_P ||
@@ -82,12 +83,33 @@ ppm_load_read_header(FILE *fp,
}
/* Get Width and Height */
- img->width = strtol (header,&ptr,0);
- img->height = atoi (ptr);
- img->numsamples = img->width * img->height * CHANNEL_COUNT;
+ errno = 0;
+ img->width = strtol (header,&ptr,10);
+ if (errno)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Error reading width: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ else if (img->width < 0)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Error: width is negative");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ img->height = strtol (ptr,&ptr,10);
+ if (errno)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Error reading height: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ else if (img->width < 0)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Error: height is negative");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
fgets (header,MAX_CHARS_IN_ROW,fp);
- maxval = strtol (header,&ptr,0);
+ maxval = strtol (header,&ptr,10);
if ((maxval != 255) && (maxval != 65535))
{
@@ -109,6 +131,16 @@ ppm_load_read_header(FILE *fp,
g_warning ("%s: Programmer stupidity error", G_STRLOC);
}
+ /* Later on, img->numsamples is multiplied with img->bpc to allocate
+ * memory. Ensure it doesn't overflow. */
+ if (!img->width || !img->height ||
+ G_MAXSIZE / img->width / img->height / CHANNEL_COUNT < img->bpc)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Illegal width/height: %ld/%ld", img->width, img->height);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ img->numsamples = img->width * img->height * CHANNEL_COUNT;
+
return TRUE;
}
@@ -229,12 +261,24 @@ process (GeglOperation *operation,
if (!ppm_load_read_header (fp, &img))
goto out;
- rect.height = img.height;
- rect.width = img.width;
-
/* Allocating Array Size */
+
+ /* Should use g_try_malloc(), but this causes crashes elsewhere because the
+ * error signalled by returning FALSE isn't properly acted upon. Therefore
+ * g_malloc() is used here which aborts if the requested memory size can't be
+ * allocated causing a controlled crash. */
img.data = (guchar*) g_malloc (img.numsamples * img.bpc);
+ /* No-op without g_try_malloc(), see above. */
+ if (! img.data)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Couldn't allocate %" G_GSIZE_FORMAT " bytes, giving up.", ((gsize)img.numsamples * img.bpc));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rect.height = img.height;
+ rect.width = img.width;
+
switch (img.bpc)
{
case 1:
--
1.8.3.1