Remove DH-AES/DH-BLOWFISH mechanisms and misc cleanup
- AES and Blowfish mechanisms are deemed insecure and servers have removed support for them - Remove attempts to retry since we only support one mech - Handle SASL 3.2's new syntax for supported mechs
This commit is contained in:
parent
6b62c4738d
commit
4362085847
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@ -422,9 +422,7 @@ typedef struct session
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/* SASL Mechanisms */
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#define MECH_PLAIN 0
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#define MECH_BLOWFISH 1
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#define MECH_AES 2
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#define MECH_EXTERNAL 3
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#define MECH_EXTERNAL 1
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typedef struct server
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{
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@ -546,7 +544,6 @@ typedef struct server
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unsigned int skip_next_whois:1; /* hide whois output */
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unsigned int inside_whois:1;
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unsigned int doing_dns:1; /* /dns has been done */
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unsigned int retry_sasl:1; /* retrying another sasl mech */
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unsigned int end_of_motd:1; /* end of motd reached (logged in) */
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unsigned int sent_quit:1; /* sent a QUIT already? */
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unsigned int use_listargs:1; /* undernet and dalnet need /list >0,<10000 */
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@ -570,7 +567,6 @@ typedef struct server
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unsigned int have_cert:1; /* have loaded a cert */
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unsigned int use_who:1; /* whether to use WHO command to get dcc_ip */
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unsigned int sasl_mech; /* mechanism for sasl auth */
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unsigned int sent_saslauth:1; /* have sent AUTHENICATE yet */
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unsigned int sent_capend:1; /* have sent CAP END yet */
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unsigned int waiting_on_cap:1; /* waiting on another line of CAP LS */
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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@ -1633,6 +1633,12 @@ inbound_identified (server *serv) /* 'MODE +e MYSELF' on freenode */
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}
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}
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static const char *sasl_mechanisms[] =
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{
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"PLAIN",
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"EXTERNAL"
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};
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static void
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inbound_toggle_caps (server *serv, const char *extensions_str, gboolean enable)
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{
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@ -1666,24 +1672,12 @@ inbound_toggle_caps (server *serv, const char *extensions_str, gboolean enable)
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serv->have_sasl = enable;
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if (enable)
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{
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serv->sent_saslauth = FALSE;
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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if (serv->loginmethod == LOGIN_SASLEXTERNAL)
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{
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serv->sasl_mech = MECH_EXTERNAL;
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tcp_send_len (serv, "AUTHENTICATE EXTERNAL\r\n", 23);
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}
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else
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{
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/* default to most secure, it will fallback if not supported */
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serv->sasl_mech = MECH_AES;
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tcp_send_len (serv, "AUTHENTICATE DH-AES\r\n", 21);
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}
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#else
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serv->sasl_mech = MECH_PLAIN;
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tcp_send_len (serv, "AUTHENTICATE PLAIN\r\n", 20);
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#endif
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/* Mechanism either defaulted to PLAIN or server gave us list */
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE %s\r\n", sasl_mechanisms[serv->sasl_mech]);
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}
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}
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}
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@ -1735,6 +1729,37 @@ static const char * const supported_caps[] = {
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"twitch.tv/membership",
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};
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static int
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get_supported_mech (server *serv, const char *list)
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{
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char **mechs = g_strsplit (list, ",", 0);
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gsize i;
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int ret = -1;
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for (i = 0; mechs[i]; ++i)
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{
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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if (serv->loginmethod == LOGIN_SASLEXTERNAL)
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{
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if (!strcmp (mechs[i], "EXTERNAL"))
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{
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ret = MECH_EXTERNAL;
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break;
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}
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}
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else
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#endif
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if (!strcmp (mechs[i], "PLAIN"))
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{
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ret = MECH_PLAIN;
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break;
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}
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}
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g_strfreev (mechs);
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return ret;
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}
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void
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inbound_cap_ls (server *serv, char *nick, char *extensions_str,
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const message_tags_data *tags_data)
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@ -1781,6 +1806,13 @@ inbound_cap_ls (server *serv, char *nick, char *extensions_str,
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((serv->loginmethod == LOGIN_SASL && strlen (serv->password) != 0)
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|| (serv->loginmethod == LOGIN_SASLEXTERNAL && serv->have_cert)))
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{
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if (value)
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{
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int sasl_mech = get_supported_mech (serv, value);
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if (sasl_mech == -1) /* No supported mech */
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continue;
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serv->sasl_mech = sasl_mech;
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}
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want_cap = TRUE;
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want_sasl = TRUE;
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g_strlcat (buffer, "sasl ", sizeof(buffer));
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@ -1839,40 +1871,6 @@ inbound_cap_list (server *serv, char *nick, char *extensions,
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NULL, NULL, 0, tags_data->timestamp);
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}
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static const char *sasl_mechanisms[] =
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{
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"PLAIN",
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"DH-BLOWFISH",
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"DH-AES",
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"EXTERNAL"
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};
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void
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inbound_sasl_supportedmechs (server *serv, char *list)
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{
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int i;
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if (serv->sasl_mech != MECH_EXTERNAL)
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{
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/* Use most secure one supported */
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for (i = MECH_AES; i >= MECH_PLAIN; i--)
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{
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if (strstr (list, sasl_mechanisms[i]) != NULL)
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{
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serv->sasl_mech = i;
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serv->retry_sasl = TRUE;
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE %s\r\n", sasl_mechanisms[i]);
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return;
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}
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}
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}
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/* Abort, none supported */
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serv->sent_saslauth = TRUE;
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE *\r\n");
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return;
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}
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void
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inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data)
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{
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@ -1880,12 +1878,10 @@ inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data)
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char *user, *pass = NULL;
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const char *mech = sasl_mechanisms[serv->sasl_mech];
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/* Got a list of supported mechanisms from inspircd */
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/* Got a list of supported mechanisms from outdated inspircd
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* just ignore it as it goes against spec */
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if (strchr (data, ',') != NULL)
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{
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inbound_sasl_supportedmechs (serv, data);
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return;
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}
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if (net->user && !(net->flags & FLAG_USE_GLOBAL))
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user = net->user;
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@ -1898,12 +1894,6 @@ inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data)
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pass = encode_sasl_pass_plain (user, serv->password);
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break;
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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case MECH_BLOWFISH:
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pass = encode_sasl_pass_blowfish (user, serv->password, data);
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break;
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case MECH_AES:
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pass = encode_sasl_pass_aes (user, serv->password, data);
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break;
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case MECH_EXTERNAL:
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pass = g_strdup ("+");
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break;
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@ -1913,12 +1903,10 @@ inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data)
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if (pass == NULL)
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{
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/* something went wrong abort */
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serv->sent_saslauth = TRUE; /* prevent trying PLAIN */
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE *\r\n");
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return;
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}
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serv->sent_saslauth = TRUE;
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE %s\r\n", pass);
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g_free (pass);
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@ -1927,19 +1915,9 @@ inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data)
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NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
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}
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int
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void
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inbound_sasl_error (server *serv)
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{
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if (serv->retry_sasl && !serv->sent_saslauth)
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return 1;
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/* If server sent 904 before we sent password,
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* mech not support so fallback to next mech */
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if (!serv->sent_saslauth && serv->sasl_mech != MECH_EXTERNAL && serv->sasl_mech != MECH_PLAIN)
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{
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serv->sasl_mech -= 1;
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE %s\r\n", sasl_mechanisms[serv->sasl_mech]);
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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/* Just abort, not much we can do */
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tcp_sendf (serv, "AUTHENTICATE *\r\n");
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}
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@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ void inbound_cap_list (server *serv, char *nick, char *extensions,
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void inbound_cap_del (server *serv, char *nick, char *extensions,
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const message_tags_data *tags_data);
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void inbound_sasl_authenticate (server *serv, char *data);
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int inbound_sasl_error (server *serv);
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void inbound_sasl_supportedmechs (server *serv, char *list);
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void inbound_sasl_error (server *serv);
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void do_dns (session *sess, char *nick, char *host,
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const message_tags_data *tags_data);
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gboolean alert_match_word (char *word, char *masks);
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@ -946,10 +946,9 @@ process_numeric (session * sess, int n,
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word_eol[6]+1, word[1], word[2], NULL, 0,
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tags_data->timestamp);
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break;
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case 903: /* successful SASL auth */
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case 904: /* failed SASL auth */
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if (inbound_sasl_error (serv))
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break; /* might retry */
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inbound_sasl_error (serv);
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case 903: /* successful SASL auth */
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case 905: /* failed SASL auth */
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case 906: /* aborted */
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case 907: /* attempting to re-auth after a successful auth */
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@ -963,7 +962,7 @@ process_numeric (session * sess, int n,
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}
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break;
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case 908: /* Supported SASL Mechs */
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inbound_sasl_supportedmechs (serv, word[4]);
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/* ignored for now, SASL 3.2 is a better solution and we only do PLAIN atm */
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break;
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default:
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@ -1727,6 +1727,7 @@ server_set_defaults (server *serv)
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serv->chanmodes = g_strdup ("beI,k,l");
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serv->nick_prefixes = g_strdup ("@%+");
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serv->nick_modes = g_strdup ("ohv");
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serv->sasl_mech = MECH_PLAIN;
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server_set_encoding (serv, "UTF-8");
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@ -56,8 +56,6 @@
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#ifndef WIN32
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#endif
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@ -1393,227 +1391,6 @@ encode_sasl_pass_plain (char *user, char *pass)
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return encoded;
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}
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#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
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/* Adapted from ZNC's SASL module */
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static int
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parse_dh (char *str, DH **dh_out, unsigned char **secret_out, int *keysize_out)
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{
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DH *dh;
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guchar *data, *decoded_data;
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guchar *secret = NULL;
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gsize data_len;
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guint size;
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guint16 size16;
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BIGNUM *pubkey;
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gint key_size;
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dh = DH_new();
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data = decoded_data = g_base64_decode (str, &data_len);
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if (data_len < 2)
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goto fail;
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/* prime number */
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memcpy (&size16, data, sizeof(size16));
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size = ntohs (size16);
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data += 2;
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data_len -= 2;
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if (size > data_len)
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goto fail;
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dh->p = BN_bin2bn (data, size, NULL);
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data += size;
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/* Generator */
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if (data_len < 2)
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goto fail;
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memcpy (&size16, data, sizeof(size16));
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size = ntohs (size16);
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data += 2;
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data_len -= 2;
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if (size > data_len)
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goto fail;
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dh->g = BN_bin2bn (data, size, NULL);
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data += size;
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/* pub key */
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if (data_len < 2)
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goto fail;
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memcpy (&size16, data, sizeof(size16));
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size = ntohs(size16);
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data += 2;
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data_len -= 2;
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pubkey = BN_bin2bn (data, size, NULL);
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if (!(DH_generate_key (dh)))
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goto fail;
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secret = g_malloc (DH_size (dh));
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key_size = DH_compute_key (secret, pubkey, dh);
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if (key_size == -1)
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goto fail;
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g_free (decoded_data);
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*dh_out = dh;
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*secret_out = secret;
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*keysize_out = key_size;
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return 1;
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fail:
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g_free (secret);
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g_free (decoded_data);
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return 0;
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}
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char *
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encode_sasl_pass_blowfish (char *user, char *pass, char *data)
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{
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DH *dh;
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char *response, *ret = NULL;
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unsigned char *secret;
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unsigned char *encrypted_pass;
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char *plain_pass;
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BF_KEY key;
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int key_size, length;
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int pass_len = strlen (pass) + (8 - (strlen (pass) % 8));
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int user_len = strlen (user);
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guint16 size16;
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char *in_ptr, *out_ptr;
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if (!parse_dh (data, &dh, &secret, &key_size))
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return NULL;
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BF_set_key (&key, key_size, secret);
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encrypted_pass = g_malloc0 (pass_len);
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plain_pass = g_malloc0 (pass_len);
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memcpy (plain_pass, pass, strlen(pass));
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out_ptr = (char*)encrypted_pass;
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in_ptr = (char*)plain_pass;
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for (length = pass_len; length; length -= 8, in_ptr += 8, out_ptr += 8)
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BF_ecb_encrypt ((unsigned char*)in_ptr, (unsigned char*)out_ptr, &key, BF_ENCRYPT);
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/* Create response */
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length = 2 + BN_num_bytes (dh->pub_key) + pass_len + user_len + 1;
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response = g_malloc0 (length);
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out_ptr = response;
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/* our key */
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size16 = htons ((guint16)BN_num_bytes (dh->pub_key));
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memcpy (out_ptr, &size16, sizeof(size16));
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out_ptr += 2;
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BN_bn2bin (dh->pub_key, (guchar*)out_ptr);
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out_ptr += BN_num_bytes (dh->pub_key);
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/* username */
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memcpy (out_ptr, user, user_len + 1);
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out_ptr += user_len + 1;
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/* pass */
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memcpy (out_ptr, encrypted_pass, pass_len);
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ret = g_base64_encode ((const guchar*)response, length);
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g_free (response);
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DH_free(dh);
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g_free (plain_pass);
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g_free (encrypted_pass);
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g_free (secret);
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return ret;
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}
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char *
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encode_sasl_pass_aes (char *user, char *pass, char *data)
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{
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DH *dh;
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AES_KEY key;
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char *response = NULL;
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char *out_ptr, *ret = NULL;
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unsigned char *secret, *ptr;
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unsigned char *encrypted_userpass, *plain_userpass;
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int key_size, length;
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guint16 size16;
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unsigned char iv[16], iv_copy[16];
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int user_len = strlen (user) + 1;
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int pass_len = strlen (pass) + 1;
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int len = user_len + pass_len;
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int padlen = 16 - (len % 16);
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int userpass_len = len + padlen;
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if (!parse_dh (data, &dh, &secret, &key_size))
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return NULL;
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encrypted_userpass = g_malloc0 (userpass_len);
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plain_userpass = g_malloc0 (userpass_len);
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/* create message */
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/* format of: <username>\0<password>\0<padding> */
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ptr = plain_userpass;
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memcpy (ptr, user, user_len);
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ptr += user_len;
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memcpy (ptr, pass, pass_len);
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ptr += pass_len;
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if (padlen)
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{
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/* Padding */
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unsigned char randbytes[16];
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if (!RAND_bytes (randbytes, padlen))
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goto end;
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memcpy (ptr, randbytes, padlen);
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}
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if (!RAND_bytes (iv, sizeof (iv)))
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goto end;
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memcpy (iv_copy, iv, sizeof(iv));
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/* Encrypt */
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AES_set_encrypt_key (secret, key_size * 8, &key);
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AES_cbc_encrypt(plain_userpass, encrypted_userpass, userpass_len, &key, iv_copy, AES_ENCRYPT);
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||||
|
||||
/* Create response */
|
||||
/* format of: <size pubkey><pubkey><iv (always 16 bytes)><ciphertext> */
|
||||
length = 2 + key_size + sizeof(iv) + userpass_len;
|
||||
response = g_malloc (length);
|
||||
out_ptr = response;
|
||||
|
||||
/* our key */
|
||||
size16 = htons ((guint16)key_size);
|
||||
memcpy (out_ptr, &size16, sizeof(size16));
|
||||
out_ptr += 2;
|
||||
BN_bn2bin (dh->pub_key, (guchar*)out_ptr);
|
||||
out_ptr += key_size;
|
||||
|
||||
/* iv */
|
||||
memcpy (out_ptr, iv, sizeof(iv));
|
||||
out_ptr += sizeof(iv);
|
||||
|
||||
/* userpass */
|
||||
memcpy (out_ptr, encrypted_userpass, userpass_len);
|
||||
|
||||
ret = g_base64_encode ((const guchar*)response, length);
|
||||
|
||||
end:
|
||||
DH_free (dh);
|
||||
g_free (plain_userpass);
|
||||
g_free (encrypted_userpass);
|
||||
g_free (secret);
|
||||
g_free (response);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
|
||||
static char *
|
||||
str_sha256hash (char *string)
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ void canonalize_key (char *key);
|
|||
int portable_mode (void);
|
||||
int unity_mode (void);
|
||||
char *encode_sasl_pass_plain (char *user, char *pass);
|
||||
char *encode_sasl_pass_blowfish (char *user, char *pass, char *data);
|
||||
char *encode_sasl_pass_aes (char *user, char *pass, char *data);
|
||||
char *challengeauth_response (char *username, char *password, char *challenge);
|
||||
size_t strftime_validated (char *dest, size_t destsize, const char *format, const struct tm *time);
|
||||
gsize strftime_utf8 (char *dest, gsize destsize, const char *format, time_t time);
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue