# -*- coding:utf-8 -*- ## src/common/stanza_session.py ## ## Copyright (C) 2007-2010 Yann Leboulanger ## Copyright (C) 2007 Julien Pivotto ## Copyright (C) 2007-2008 Brendan Taylor ## Jean-Marie Traissard ## Copyright (C) 2008 Jonathan Schleifer ## ## This file is part of Gajim. ## ## Gajim is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify ## it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published ## by the Free Software Foundation; version 3 only. ## ## Gajim is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ## but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ## MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ## GNU General Public License for more details. ## ## You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ## along with Gajim. If not, see . ## from common import gajim from common import xmpp from common.exceptions import DecryptionError, NegotiationError import xmpp.c14n import itertools import random import string import time import base64 import os from hashlib import sha256 from hmac import HMAC from common import crypto if gajim.HAVE_PYCRYPTO: from Crypto.Cipher import AES from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA from common import dh import secrets XmlDsig = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#' class StanzaSession(object): ''' ''' def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_): ''' ''' self.conn = conn self.jid = jid self.type = type_ self.resource = None if thread_id: self.received_thread_id = True self.thread_id = thread_id else: self.received_thread_id = False if type_ == 'normal': self.thread_id = None else: self.thread_id = self.generate_thread_id() self.loggable = True self.last_send = 0 self.last_receive = 0 self.status = None self.negotiated = {} def is_loggable(self): return self.loggable and gajim.config.should_log(self.conn.name, self.jid) def get_to(self): to = str(self.jid) if self.resource and not to.endswith(self.resource): to += '/' + self.resource return to def remove_events(self, types): """ Remove events associated with this session from the queue Returns True if any events were removed (unlike events.py remove_events) """ any_removed = False for j in (self.jid, self.jid.getStripped()): for event in gajim.events.get_events(self.conn.name, j, types=types): # the event wasn't in this session if (event.type_ == 'chat' and event.parameters[8] != self) or \ (event.type_ == 'printed_chat' and event.parameters[0].session != \ self): continue # events.remove_events returns True when there were no events # for some reason r = gajim.events.remove_events(self.conn.name, j, event) if not r: any_removed = True return any_removed def generate_thread_id(self): return ''.join([f(string.ascii_letters) for f in itertools.repeat( random.choice, 32)]) def send(self, msg): if self.thread_id: msg.NT.thread = self.thread_id msg.setAttr('to', self.get_to()) self.conn.send_stanza(msg) if isinstance(msg, xmpp.Message): self.last_send = time.time() def reject_negotiation(self, body=None): msg = xmpp.Message() feature = msg.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='0')) feature.addChild(node=x) if body: msg.setBody(body) self.send(msg) self.cancelled_negotiation() def cancelled_negotiation(self): """ A negotiation has been cancelled, so reset this session to its default state """ if self.control: self.control.on_cancel_session_negotiation() self.status = None self.negotiated = {} def terminate(self, send_termination = True): # only send termination message if we've sent a message and think they # have XEP-0201 support if send_termination and self.last_send > 0 and \ (self.received_thread_id or self.last_receive == 0): msg = xmpp.Message() feature = msg.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='terminate', value='1')) feature.addChild(node=x) self.send(msg) self.status = None def acknowledge_termination(self): # we could send an acknowledgement message to the remote client here self.status = None class ArchivingStanzaSession(StanzaSession): def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat'): StanzaSession.__init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat') self.archiving = False def archiving_logging_preference(self, initiator_options=None): return self.conn.logging_preference(self.jid, initiator_options) def negotiate_archiving(self): self.negotiated = {} request = xmpp.Message() feature = request.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='form') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1', typ='boolean', required=True)) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', typ='list-single', options=self.archiving_logging_preference(), required=True)) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='disclosure', typ='list-single', options=['never'], required=True)) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='security', typ='list-single', options=['none'], required=True)) feature.addChild(node=x) self.status = 'requested-archiving' self.send(request) def respond_archiving(self, form): field = form.getField('logging') options = [x[1] for x in field.getOptions()] values = field.getValues() logging = self.archiving_logging_preference(options) self.negotiated['logging'] = logging response = xmpp.Message() feature = response.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', value=logging)) self.status = 'responded-archiving' feature.addChild(node=x) if not logging: response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature') n = xmpp.Node('field') n['var'] = 'logging' feature.addChild(node=n) response.T.error.addChild(node=feature) self.send(response) def we_accept_archiving(self, form): if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot': self.loggable = False log.debug('archiving session accepted: %s' % self.loggable) self.status = 'active' self.archiving = True if self.control: self.control.print_archiving_session_details() def archiving_accepted(self, form): negotiated = {} ask_user = {} not_acceptable = [] if form['logging'] not in self.archiving_logging_preference(): raise self.negotiated['logging'] = form['logging'] accept = xmpp.Message() feature = accept.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result') result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1')) feature.addChild(node=result) self.send(accept) if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot': self.loggable = False log.debug('archiving session accepted: %s' % self.loggable) self.status = 'active' self.archiving = True if self.control: self.control.print_archiving_session_details() class EncryptedStanzaSession(ArchivingStanzaSession): """ An encrypted stanza negotiation has several states. They arerepresented as the following values in the 'status' attribute of the session object: 1. None: default state 2. 'requested-e2e': this client has initiated an esession negotiation and is waiting for a response 3. 'responded-e2e': this client has responded to an esession negotiation request and is waiting for the initiator to identify itself and complete the negotiation 4. 'identified-alice': this client identified itself and is waiting for the responder to identify itself and complete the negotiation 5. 'active': an encrypted session has been successfully negotiated. messages of any of the types listed in 'encryptable_stanzas' should be encrypted before they're sent. The transition between these states is handled in gajim.py's handle_session_negotiation method. """ def __init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat'): StanzaSession.__init__(self, conn, jid, thread_id, type_='chat') self.xes = {} self.es = {} self.n = 128 self.enable_encryption = False # _s denotes 'self' (ie. this client) self._kc_s = None # _o denotes 'other' (ie. the client at the other end of the session) self._kc_o = None # has the remote contact's identity ever been verified? self.verified_identity = False def _get_contact(self): c = gajim.contacts.get_contact(self.conn.name, self.jid, self.resource) if not c: c = gajim.contacts.get_contact(self.conn.name, self.jid) return c def _is_buggy_gajim(self): c = self._get_contact() if c and c.supports(xmpp.NS_ROSTERX): return False return True def set_kc_s(self, value): """ Keep the encrypter updated with my latest cipher key """ self._kc_s = value self.encrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_s, self.cipher.MODE_CTR, counter=self.encryptcounter) def get_kc_s(self): return self._kc_s def set_kc_o(self, value): """ Keep the decrypter updated with the other party's latest cipher key """ self._kc_o = value self.decrypter = self.cipher.new(self._kc_o, self.cipher.MODE_CTR, counter=self.decryptcounter) def get_kc_o(self): return self._kc_o kc_s = property(get_kc_s, set_kc_s) kc_o = property(get_kc_o, set_kc_o) def encryptcounter(self): self.c_s = (self.c_s + 1) % (2 ** self.n) return crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_s) def decryptcounter(self): self.c_o = (self.c_o + 1) % (2 ** self.n) return crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o) def sign(self, string): if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'): hash_ = crypto.sha256(string) return crypto.encode_mpi(gajim.pubkey.sign(hash_, '')[0]) def encrypt_stanza(self, stanza): encryptable = [x for x in stanza.getChildren() if x.getName() not in ('error', 'amp', 'thread')] # FIXME can also encrypt contents of elements in stanzas @type = # 'error' # (except for child elements) old_en_counter = self.c_s for element in encryptable: stanza.delChild(element) plaintext = ''.join(map(str, encryptable)) m_compressed = self.compress(plaintext) m_final = self.encrypt(m_compressed) c = stanza.NT.c c.setNamespace('http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns') c.NT.data = base64.b64encode(m_final) # FIXME check for rekey request, handle elements m_content = ''.join(map(str, c.getChildren())) c.NT.mac = base64.b64encode(self.hmac(self.km_s, m_content + \ crypto.encode_mpi(old_en_counter))) msgtxt = '[This is part of an encrypted session. ' \ 'If you see this message, something went wrong.]' lang = os.getenv('LANG') if lang is not None and lang != 'en': # we're not english msgtxt = _('[This is part of an encrypted session. ' 'If you see this message, something went wrong.]') + ' (' + \ msgtxt + ')' stanza.setBody(msgtxt) return stanza def is_xep_200_encrypted(self, msg): msg.getTag('c', namespace=xmpp.NS_STANZA_CRYPTO) def hmac(self, key, content): return HMAC(key, content, self.hash_alg).digest() def generate_initiator_keys(self, k): return (self.hmac(k, 'Initiator Cipher Key'), self.hmac(k, 'Initiator MAC Key'), self.hmac(k, 'Initiator SIGMA Key')) def generate_responder_keys(self, k): return (self.hmac(k, 'Responder Cipher Key'), self.hmac(k, 'Responder MAC Key'), self.hmac(k, 'Responder SIGMA Key')) def compress(self, plaintext): if self.compression is None: return plaintext def decompress(self, compressed): if self.compression is None: return compressed def encrypt(self, encryptable): padded = crypto.pad_to_multiple(encryptable, 16, ' ', False) return self.encrypter.encrypt(padded) def decrypt_stanza(self, stanza): """ Delete the unencrypted explanation body, if it exists """ orig_body = stanza.getTag('body') if orig_body: stanza.delChild(orig_body) c = stanza.getTag(name='c', namespace='http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0200.html#ns') stanza.delChild(c) # contents of , minus , minus whitespace macable = ''.join(str(x) for x in c.getChildren() if x.getName() != 'mac') received_mac = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('mac')) calculated_mac = self.hmac(self.km_o, macable + \ crypto.encode_mpi_with_padding(self.c_o)) if not calculated_mac == received_mac: raise DecryptionError('bad signature') m_final = base64.b64decode(c.getTagData('data')) m_compressed = self.decrypt(m_final) plaintext = self.decompress(m_compressed) try: parsed = xmpp.Node(node='' + plaintext + '') except Exception: raise DecryptionError('decrypted not parseable as XML') for child in parsed.getChildren(): stanza.addChild(node=child) return stanza def decrypt(self, ciphertext): return self.decrypter.decrypt(ciphertext) def logging_preference(self): if gajim.config.get_per('accounts', self.conn.name, 'log_encrypted_sessions'): return ['may', 'mustnot'] else: return ['mustnot', 'may'] def get_shared_secret(self, e, y, p): if (not 1 < e < (p - 1)): raise NegotiationError('invalid DH value') return crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(crypto.powmod(e, y, p))) def c7lize_mac_id(self, form): kids = form.getChildren() macable = [x for x in kids if x.getVar() not in ('mac', 'identity')] return ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el in \ macable) def verify_identity(self, form, dh_i, sigmai, i_o): m_o = base64.b64decode(form['mac']) id_o = base64.b64decode(form['identity']) m_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.km_o, crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o) + id_o) if m_o_calculated != m_o: raise NegotiationError('calculated m_%s differs from received m_%s' % (i_o, i_o)) if i_o == 'a' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5': # we don't need to calculate this if there's a verified retained secret # (but we do anyways) self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_o, self.form_s) if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']: plaintext = self.decrypt(id_o) parsed = xmpp.Node(node='' + plaintext + '') if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey'] == 'hash': # fingerprint = parsed.getTagData('fingerprint') # FIXME find stored pubkey or terminate session raise NotImplementedError() else: if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'): keyvalue = parsed.getTag(name='RSAKeyValue', namespace=XmlDsig) n, e = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode( keyvalue.getTagData(x))) for x in ('Modulus', 'Exponent')) eir_pubkey = RSA.construct((n, long(e))) pubkey_o = xmpp.c14n.c14n(keyvalue, self._is_buggy_gajim()) else: # FIXME DSA, etc. raise NotImplementedError() enc_sig = parsed.getTag(name='SignatureValue', namespace=XmlDsig).getData() signature = (crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(enc_sig)), ) else: mac_o = self.decrypt(id_o) pubkey_o = '' c7l_form = self.c7lize_mac_id(form) content = self.n_s + self.n_o + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_o if sigmai: self.form_o = c7l_form content += self.form_o else: form_o2 = c7l_form content += self.form_o + form_o2 mac_o_calculated = self.hmac(self.ks_o, content) if self.negotiated['recv_pubkey']: hash_ = crypto.sha256(mac_o_calculated) if not eir_pubkey.verify(hash_, signature): raise NegotiationError('public key signature verification failed!') elif mac_o_calculated != mac_o: raise NegotiationError('calculated mac_%s differs from received mac_%s' % (i_o, i_o)) def make_identity(self, form, dh_i): if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']: if self.negotiated['sign_algs'] == (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256'): pubkey = secrets.secrets().my_pubkey(self.conn.name) fields = (pubkey.n, pubkey.e) cb_fields = [base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(f)) for f in fields] pubkey_s = '%s%s' % \ tuple(cb_fields) else: pubkey_s = '' form_s2 = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el in \ form.getChildren()) old_c_s = self.c_s content = self.n_o + self.n_s + crypto.encode_mpi(dh_i) + pubkey_s + \ self.form_s + form_s2 mac_s = self.hmac(self.ks_s, content) if self.negotiated['send_pubkey']: signature = self.sign(mac_s) sign_s = '' '%s' % base64.b64encode(signature) if self.negotiated['send_pubkey'] == 'hash': b64ed = base64.b64encode(self.hash(pubkey_s)) pubkey_s = '%s' % b64ed id_s = self.encrypt(pubkey_s + sign_s) else: id_s = self.encrypt(mac_s) m_s = self.hmac(self.km_s, crypto.encode_mpi(old_c_s) + id_s) if self.status == 'requested-e2e' and self.sas_algs == 'sas28x5': # we're alice; check for a retained secret # if none exists, prompt the user with the SAS self.sas = crypto.sas_28x5(m_s, self.form_o) if self.sigmai: # FIXME save retained secret? self.check_identity(tuple) return (xmpp.DataField(name='identity', value=base64.b64encode(id_s)), xmpp.DataField(name='mac', value=base64.b64encode(m_s))) def negotiate_e2e(self, sigmai): self.negotiated = {} request = xmpp.Message() feature = request.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='form') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1', typ='boolean', required=True)) # this field is incorrectly called 'otr' in XEPs 0116 and 0217 x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='logging', typ='list-single', options=self.logging_preference(), required=True)) # unsupported options: 'disabled', 'enabled' x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='disclosure', typ='list-single', options=['never'], required=True)) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='security', typ='list-single', options=['e2e'], required=True)) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='crypt_algs', value='aes128-ctr', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='hash_algs', value='sha256', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='compress', value='none', typ='hidden')) # unsupported options: 'iq', 'presence' x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='stanzas', typ='list-multi', options=['message'])) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='init_pubkey', options=['none', 'key', 'hash'], typ='list-single')) # FIXME store key, use hash x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='resp_pubkey', options=['none', 'key'], typ='list-single')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='ver', value='1.0', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rekey_freq', value='4294967295', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='sas_algs', value='sas28x5', typ='hidden')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='sign_algs', value='http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha256', typ='hidden')) self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce() x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='my_nonce', value=base64.b64encode(self.n_s), typ='hidden')) modp_options = [ int(g) for g in gajim.config.get('esession_modp').split( ',') ] x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', typ='list-single', options=[[None, y] for y in modp_options])) x.addChild(node=self.make_dhfield(modp_options, sigmai)) self.sigmai = sigmai self.form_s = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \ in x.getChildren()) feature.addChild(node=x) self.status = 'requested-e2e' self.send(request) def verify_options_bob(self, form): """ 4.3 esession response (bob) """ negotiated = {'recv_pubkey': None, 'send_pubkey': None} not_acceptable = [] ask_user = {} fixed = { 'disclosure': 'never', 'security': 'e2e', 'crypt_algs': 'aes128-ctr', 'hash_algs': 'sha256', 'compress': 'none', 'stanzas': 'message', 'init_pubkey': 'none', 'resp_pubkey': 'none', 'ver': '1.0', 'sas_algs': 'sas28x5' } self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message'] self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5' self.cipher = AES self.hash_alg = sha256 self.compression = None for name in form.asDict(): field = form.getField(name) options = [x[1] for x in field.getOptions()] values = field.getValues() if not field.getType() in ('list-single', 'list-multi'): options = values if name in fixed: if fixed[name] in options: negotiated[name] = fixed[name] else: not_acceptable.append(name) elif name == 'rekey_freq': preferred = int(options[0]) negotiated['rekey_freq'] = preferred self.rekey_freq = preferred elif name == 'logging': my_prefs = self.logging_preference() if my_prefs[0] in options: # our first choice is offered, select it pref = my_prefs[0] negotiated['logging'] = pref else: # see if other acceptable choices are offered for pref in my_prefs: if pref in options: ask_user['logging'] = pref break if not 'logging' in ask_user: not_acceptable.append(name) elif name == 'init_pubkey': for x in ('key'): if x in options: negotiated['recv_pubkey'] = x break elif name == 'resp_pubkey': for x in ('hash', 'key'): if x in options: negotiated['send_pubkey'] = x break elif name == 'sign_algs': if (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256') in options: negotiated['sign_algs'] = XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256' else: # FIXME some things are handled elsewhere, some things are # not-implemented pass return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user) def respond_e2e_bob(self, form, negotiated, not_acceptable): """ 4.3 esession response (bob) """ response = xmpp.Message() feature = response.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='submit') x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='true')) for name in negotiated: # some fields are internal and should not be sent if not name in ('send_pubkey', 'recv_pubkey'): x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=negotiated[name])) self.negotiated = negotiated # the offset of the group we chose (need it to match up with the dhhash) group_order = 0 self.modp = int(form.getField('modp').getOptions()[group_order][1]) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='modp', value=self.modp)) g = dh.generators[self.modp] p = dh.primes[self.modp] self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce']) dhhashes = form.getField('dhhashes').getValues() self.negotiated['He'] = base64.b64decode(dhhashes[group_order].encode( 'utf8')) bytes = int(self.n / 8) self.n_s = crypto.generate_nonce() # n-bit random number self.c_o = crypto.decode_mpi(crypto.random_bytes(bytes)) self.c_s = self.c_o ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1)) self.y = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1) self.d = crypto.powmod(g, self.y, p) to_add = {'my_nonce': self.n_s, 'dhkeys': crypto.encode_mpi(self.d), 'counter': crypto.encode_mpi(self.c_o), 'nonce': self.n_o} for name in to_add: b64ed = base64.b64encode(to_add[name]) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name=name, value=b64ed)) self.form_o = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \ in form.getChildren()) self.form_s = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for el \ in x.getChildren()) self.status = 'responded-e2e' feature.addChild(node=x) if not_acceptable: response = xmpp.Error(response, xmpp.ERR_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature') for f in not_acceptable: n = xmpp.Node('field') n['var'] = f feature.addChild(node=n) response.T.error.addChild(node=feature) self.send(response) def verify_options_alice(self, form): """ 'Alice Accepts' """ negotiated = {} ask_user = {} not_acceptable = [] if not form['logging'] in self.logging_preference(): not_acceptable.append(form['logging']) elif form['logging'] != self.logging_preference()[0]: ask_user['logging'] = form['logging'] else: negotiated['logging'] = self.logging_preference()[0] for r, a in (('recv_pubkey', 'resp_pubkey'), ('send_pubkey', 'init_pubkey')): negotiated[r] = None if a in form.asDict() and form[a] in ('key', 'hash'): negotiated[r] = form[a] if 'sign_algs' in form.asDict(): if form['sign_algs'] in (XmlDsig + 'rsa-sha256', ): negotiated['sign_algs'] = form['sign_algs'] else: not_acceptable.append(form['sign_algs']) return (negotiated, not_acceptable, ask_user) def accept_e2e_alice(self, form, negotiated): """ 'Alice Accepts', continued """ self.encryptable_stanzas = ['message'] self.sas_algs = 'sas28x5' self.cipher = AES self.hash_alg = sha256 self.compression = None self.negotiated = negotiated accept = xmpp.Message() feature = accept.NT.feature feature.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_FEATURE) result = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result') self.c_s = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['counter'])) self.c_o = self.c_s ^ (2 ** (self.n - 1)) self.n_o = base64.b64decode(form['my_nonce']) mod_p = int(form['modp']) p = dh.primes[mod_p] x = self.xes[mod_p] e = self.es[mod_p] self.d = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys'])) self.k = self.get_shared_secret(self.d, x, p) result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='accept', value='1')) result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode(self.n_o))) self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(self.k) if self.sigmai: self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(self.k) self.verify_identity(form, self.d, True, 'b') else: srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped()) rshashes = [self.hmac(self.n_s, rs[0]) for rs in srses] if not rshashes: # we've never spoken before, but we'll pretend we have rshash_size = self.hash_alg().digest_size rshashes.append(crypto.random_bytes(rshash_size)) rshashes = [base64.b64encode(rshash) for rshash in rshashes] result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='rshashes', value=rshashes)) result.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='dhkeys', value=base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e)))) self.form_o = ''.join(xmpp.c14n.c14n(el, self._is_buggy_gajim()) for \ el in form.getChildren()) # MUST securely destroy K unless it will be used later to generate the # final shared secret for datafield in self.make_identity(result, e): result.addChild(node=datafield) feature.addChild(node=result) self.send(accept) if self.sigmai: self.status = 'active' self.enable_encryption = True else: self.status = 'identified-alice' def accept_e2e_bob(self, form): """ 4.5 esession accept (bob) """ response = xmpp.Message() init = response.NT.init init.setNamespace(xmpp.NS_ESESSION_INIT) x = xmpp.DataForm(typ='result') for field in ('nonce', 'dhkeys', 'rshashes', 'identity', 'mac'): # FIXME: will do nothing in real world... assert field in form.asDict(), "alice's form didn't have a %s field" \ % field # 4.5.1 generating provisory session keys e = crypto.decode_mpi(base64.b64decode(form['dhkeys'])) p = dh.primes[self.modp] if crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) != self.negotiated['He']: raise NegotiationError('SHA256(e) != He') k = self.get_shared_secret(e, self.y, p) self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k) # 4.5.2 verifying alice's identity self.verify_identity(form, e, False, 'a') # 4.5.4 generating bob's final session keys srs = '' srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped()) rshashes = [base64.b64decode(rshash) for rshash in form.getField( 'rshashes').getValues()] for s in srses: secret = s[0] if self.hmac(self.n_o, secret) in rshashes: srs = secret break # other shared secret # (we're not using one) oss = '' k = crypto.sha256(k + srs + oss) self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_responder_keys(k) self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_initiator_keys(k) # 4.5.5 if srs: srshash = self.hmac(srs, 'Shared Retained Secret') else: srshash = crypto.random_bytes(32) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='FORM_TYPE', value='urn:xmpp:ssn')) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='nonce', value=base64.b64encode( self.n_o))) x.addChild(node=xmpp.DataField(name='srshash', value=base64.b64encode( srshash))) for datafield in self.make_identity(x, self.d): x.addChild(node=datafield) init.addChild(node=x) self.send(response) self.do_retained_secret(k, srs) if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot': self.loggable = False self.status = 'active' self.enable_encryption = True if self.control: self.control.print_esession_details() def final_steps_alice(self, form): srs = '' srses = secrets.secrets().retained_secrets(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped()) try: srshash = base64.b64decode(form['srshash']) except IndexError: return for s in srses: secret = s[0] if self.hmac(secret, 'Shared Retained Secret') == srshash: srs = secret break oss = '' k = crypto.sha256(self.k + srs + oss) del self.k self.do_retained_secret(k, srs) # ks_s doesn't need to be calculated here self.kc_s, self.km_s, self.ks_s = self.generate_initiator_keys(k) self.kc_o, self.km_o, self.ks_o = self.generate_responder_keys(k) # 4.6.2 Verifying Bob's Identity self.verify_identity(form, self.d, False, 'b') # Note: If Alice discovers an error then she SHOULD ignore any encrypted # content she received in the stanza. if self.negotiated['logging'] == 'mustnot': self.loggable = False self.status = 'active' self.enable_encryption = True if self.control: self.control.print_esession_details() def do_retained_secret(self, k, old_srs): """ Calculate the new retained secret. determine if the user needs to check the remote party's identity. Set up callbacks for when the identity has been verified """ new_srs = self.hmac(k, 'New Retained Secret') self.srs = new_srs account = self.conn.name bjid = self.jid.getStripped() self.verified_identity = False if old_srs: if secrets.secrets().srs_verified(account, bjid, old_srs): # already had a stored secret verified by the user. secrets.secrets().replace_srs(account, bjid, old_srs, new_srs, True) # continue without warning. self.verified_identity = True else: # had a secret, but it wasn't verified. secrets.secrets().replace_srs(account, bjid, old_srs, new_srs, False) else: # we don't even have an SRS secrets.secrets().save_new_srs(account, bjid, new_srs, False) def _verified_srs_cb(self): secrets.secrets().replace_srs(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped(), self.srs, self.srs, True) def _unverified_srs_cb(self): secrets.secrets().replace_srs(self.conn.name, self.jid.getStripped(), self.srs, self.srs, False) def make_dhfield(self, modp_options, sigmai): dhs = [] for modp in modp_options: p = dh.primes[modp] g = dh.generators[modp] x = crypto.srand(2 ** (2 * self.n - 1), p - 1) # FIXME this may be a source of performance issues e = crypto.powmod(g, x, p) self.xes[modp] = x self.es[modp] = e if sigmai: dhs.append(base64.b64encode(crypto.encode_mpi(e))) name = 'dhkeys' else: He = crypto.sha256(crypto.encode_mpi(e)) dhs.append(base64.b64encode(He)) name = 'dhhashes' return xmpp.DataField(name=name, typ='hidden', value=dhs) def terminate_e2e(self): self.terminate() self.enable_encryption = False def acknowledge_termination(self): StanzaSession.acknowledge_termination(self) self.enable_encryption = False def fail_bad_negotiation(self, reason, fields=None): """ Send an error and cancels everything If fields is None, the remote party has given us a bad cryptographic value of some kind. Otherwise, list the fields we haven't implemented. """ err = xmpp.Error(xmpp.Message(), xmpp.ERR_FEATURE_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) err.T.error.T.text.setData(reason) if fields: feature = xmpp.Node(xmpp.NS_FEATURE + ' feature') for field in fields: fn = xmpp.Node('field') fn['var'] = field feature.addChild(node=feature) err.addChild(node=feature) self.send(err) self.status = None self.enable_encryption = False # this prevents the MAC check on decryption from succeeding, # preventing falsified messages from going through. self.km_o = '' def cancelled_negotiation(self): StanzaSession.cancelled_negotiation(self) self.enable_encryption = False self.km_o = ''